We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness.
Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. We assume that each agent has continuous, strictly convex, and "separable" preference. A preference is separable if the preference over consumption of each commodity is not affected by the consumption levels of the other commodities. A rule is a function which chooses a feasible allocation for each preference profile.
Preferences are usually private information. Agents may strategically misrepresent their preferences to obtain assignments they prefer. As a result, the chosen allocations may not be socially desirable relative to the agents' true preferences. Thus, it is important for a rule to give agents the incentive to represent their preferences truthfully. The condition is called strategy-proofness.
1 Our purpose is to identify the class of strategy-proof rules which yield socially desirable allocations.
In the one-commodity case, it is well-known that the so-called "uniform rule" is strategy-proof. For this rule, agents are allowed to choose their consumption subject to a common upper or lower bound, which is chosen so as to attain feasibility. In this article, we characterize a multiple-commodity version of the uniform rule by strategy-proofness and the following three axioms. First is unanimity, a weak condition of efficiency. It says that if the sum of the peak amounts of each commodity is equal to the supply of the commodity, then each agent's assignment should be equal to his own peak vector. Second is symmetry, a weak condition of fairness. It says that two agents with the same preferences should receive assignments between which they are indifferent. Third is nonbossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) . It says that when an agent's preferences change, if his assignment remains the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same. We establish that on the class of continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences, a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and "multidimensional single-peaked"preferences.
2 Sprumont (1991) gave the first axiomatic characterization of the uniform rule, a rule introduced by Benassy (1982) in a general equilibrium model with fixed prices. For the one-commodity case, he showed that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and anonymity 3 (alternatively, noenvy 4 ). Ching (1994) strengthened Sprumont's (1991) characterization by replacing are more than two agents, the result of Border and Jordan (1983) cannot be applied. Accordingly, we need to devise more complex proof although we owe some techniques to Sprumont's (1991) , Ching's (1994) , and Border and Jordan's (1983) . Besides, unanimity is weaker than same-sideness, and symmetry is weaker than strong symmetry or no-envy. Thus, the result of Amorós (2002) is a corollary of our result. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model and the main result. Section 3 is devoted to the proof of the result in Section 2. Section 4 provides concluding remark.
The model and the results
Let M ≡ {1, . . . , m} be a set of infinitely divisible commodities. Let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Assume that 2 ≤ n < ∞. For each commodity ∈ M , there is an amount W ∈ R ++ to be allocated. Let W ≡ (W 1 , . . . , W m ) ∈ R Let R denote the class of continuous, strictly convex, and separable preference relations on X. Any such relation is multidimensional single-peaked.
A feasible allocation is a list x ≡ (x i ) i∈N ∈ X n such that i∈N x i = W . Note that free disposal is not assumed. Let Z ≡ {(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n | i∈N x i = W } be 11 If R i is continuous and strictly convex on X, then for each x ∈ X, the set UC(R i , x) is strictly convex. The converse is not necessarily true.
the set of feasible allocations.
A preference profile is a list R ≡ (R 1 , . . . , R n ) ∈ R n . An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a function f : R n → Z. Let R −i be a list of preferences for all agents except for agent i, that is,
) be the bundle assigned to agent i by f when the preference profile is R.
We now introduce the axioms. Let f be a rule. First is an incentive property: no agent should obtain an assignment he prefers by misrepresenting his preferences.
Strategy-proofness: For each R ∈ R
n , each i ∈ N , and eachR
Our next three axioms are related to efficiency. An allocation x ∈ Z is Paretoefficient for R if there is no y ∈ Z such that, for each i ∈ N , y i R i x i , and for some j ∈ N , y j P j x j . For each R ∈ R n , let P (R) be the set of Pareto-efficient allocations for R.
Pareto-efficiency:
Second, for each commodity, if the sum of the peak amounts of the commodity is greater than, or equal to, the supply of the commodity, then each agent's assignment of the commodity should be smaller than, or equal to, his own peak amount of the commodity, and conversely.
Same-sideness:
In the one-commodity case, same-sideness is equivalent to Pareto-efficiency.
12
In the multiple-commodity case, Pareto-efficiency implies same-sideness, but the converse is not necessarily true. Example 1 illustrates this fact.
Example 1.
Let N ≡ {1, 2} and M ≡ {1, 2}. Let f be the rule defined as follows.
13
For each R ∈ R 2 , each i ∈ {1, 2}, and each ∈ {1, 2},
Then, f satisfies same-sideness. Let R ∈ R 2 be such that for each ∈ {1, 2}, p (R 1 ) = p (R 2 ) = W , and there is a bundle y 1 ∈ Z such that y 2 = W − y 1 and for each i ∈ {1, 2},
). In this case,
). Then f (R) is Pareto-dominated by y, contradicting Pareto-efficiency.
Third, if the sum of the peak amounts of each commodity is equal to the supply of the commodity, then each agent's assignment should be equal to his own peak vector.
Unanimity: For each
Obviously, same-sideness implies unanimity. It is the weakest of our three axioms related to efficiency.
Our next four axioms are related to fairness. First, no agent should prefer anyone else's assignment to his own. Second, if two agents' preferences are switched, then their assignments should be switched too. (Foley, 1967) 
No-envy
Anonymity: For each R ∈ R n , each i, j ∈ N , and eachR
Third, two agents with the same preferences should receive the same assignments.
Strong symmetry: For each
Note that anonymity implies strong symmetry. Fourth, two agents with the same preferences should receive assignments between which they are indifferent.
No-envy and strong symmetry both imply symmetry. Symmetry is the weakest of our four axioms related to fairness. In the one-commodity case, for any rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, strong symmetry is equivalent to symmetry.
14 However, in the multiple-commodity case, same-sideness and symmetry do not imply strong symmetry.
Our final axiom says that when an agent's preferences change, if his assignment remains the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same.
Nonbossiness: For each R ∈ R
Remark 1.
If there are only two agents, then any rule is nonbossy.
Next, we introduce a rule that is central to our paper. For each commodity, agents are allowed to choose their consumption subject to a common upper or lower bound, which is chosen so as to attain feasibility.
Uniform rule, U : For each R ∈ R n , each ∈ M , and each i ∈ N ,
Example 2 illustrates the definition.
, and p(R 4 ) = (5, 6).
Then,
We calculate λ 1 (R) = 3 and λ 2 (R) = 4.5. Then, U 1 (R) = (3, 5), U 2 (R) = U 3 (R) = (2, 4.5), and U 4 (R) = (3, 6).
Next is our main result, a characterization of the uniform rule. The proofs of the Theorem and Corollary are in Section 3. Amorós (2002) showed that when there are only two agents, the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and no-envy (alternatively, strong symmetry). In the two-agent case, by Remark 1, any rule is nonbossy. As we mentioned above, unanimity is a necessary condition for same-sideness, and symmetry is weaker than no-envy or strong symmetry. Thus, we obtain his result as a corollary of our Theorem.
Proof of the Theorem
We devote this section to the proof of the Theorem. It is easy to check that the uniform rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and symmetric.
15 Furthermore, we can easily verify that the single-commodity uniform rule is nonbossy. Since the uniform rule assigns commodities by applying the single-commodity uniform rule commodity by commodity, it too is nonbossy. Thus, the if part of the Theorem holds. We turn to the only if part.
For
. Then, all preference profiles inR N (x − ) are the same except for commodity , that is, for each R ∈R N (x − ) and each = ,
Let ∈ M and x − ∈ Z − . We first restrict the domain of rules to the domain R N (x − ). We show that on this domain, only the uniform rule satisfies the axioms of the Theorem. Second, we extend the result to the entire domain R n . This proof technique is similar to that of Border and Jordan (1983) . However, they study a model with public alternative, whereas we study a model with private commodities model. As we explain later, owing to this difference, the naive application of their proof techniques would cause problems that we have to overcome.
Our proof of our Theorem is by means of seven Lemmas. Lemma 1 says that strategy-proofness, unanimity, and nonbossiness imply same-sideness. In the onecommodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then it is same-sided (Serizawa, 2006) . This implication also holds in the multiple-commodity case. However, the proofs differ.
Lemma 1. If a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then it is samesided.
Proof. Let f be a rule satisfying the hypotheses. Let R ∈ R n and ∈ M . Assume that h∈N p (R h ) ≤ W . The opposite case can be treated symmetrically.
Similarly, by strategy-proofness and nonbossiness, f (R) = f (R). However, by feasibility,
. Similarly to Case 1, we derive a contradiction to unanimity by using preferences
We now introduce two additional properties of rules. First, if an agent's preferences change but his peak amounts remain the same, then his assignment should remain the same. Second, if all agents' preferences change but the peak profiles remain the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same.
Own peak-onlyness: For each R ∈ R
Peak-onlyness:
16 The condition (iii) means thatR i is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R i at f i (R). This notion was first defined by Maskin (1999) .
Note that peak-onlyness implies own peak-onlyness. In the one-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient, then it is own peak-only (Sprumont, 1991) . In the multiple-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then for each ∈ M and each x − ∈ Z − , we can establish the same property on the domainR N (x − ). Furthermore, we can also show that if a rule is nonbossy and own peak-only, then it is peak-only.
Lemma 2. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy rule. Then, for
We introduce two more properties of rules. First, for any commodity and any agent, if his peak amount of the commodity is smaller (greater) than his assignment of the commodity and his new peak amount of the commodity is smaller (greater) than, or equal to, his initial assignment of the commodity, then his assignment of the commodity should not change. Second, for any commodity and any group of agents, if for any agent in the group, the same assumption holds, then the chosen allocation of the commodity should not change.
Own uncompromisingness: For each ∈ M , each R ∈ R n , each i ∈ N , and eacĥ
Group uncompromisingness:
In the one-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient, then it satisfies own uncompromisingness (Ching, 1994) . In the multiple-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then for each ∈ M and each x − ∈ Z − , we can establish the same property on the domainR N (x − ). Furthermore, we can also show that nonbossiness and own uncompromisingness imply group uncompromisingness. 
Proof of (i). Let
The opposite case can be treated symmetrically. We show
There are two cases.
Proof of (ii). LetN
The opposite case can be treated symmetrically. Without loss of generality, letN ≡ {1, . . . ,n}.
By own uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-i),
We define a class of preferences, which we call almost indifferent to all commodities except for commodity . Given ∈ M ,
See Figure 2 for an illustration of such a preference relation. Note that for each ∈ M , each
) almost never depend on the consumption of commodities other than commodity .
Lemma 4 says that for a strategy-proof rule, and for any commodity, when an agent's preference changes, if both his old and his new preferences are almost indifferent to all commodities except for the commodity, then his assignment of the commodity changes little.
Proof. Assume that x i = 0. By a similar argument, we can also show that (3) holds when x i = W . The proof is in two steps.
Step 1.
Proof. There are two cases.
Then, sinceR
This implies
contradicting strategy-proofness.
Step 2.
Proof. There are two cases. Case 2-1:
Lemma 5 says that for a symmetric rule, and for any commodity, when two agents have a same preference, if the preference is almost indifferent to all commodities except for the commodity, then their assignments of the commodity differ little.
Proof. Assume that x i = 0. By a similar argument, we can also show that (6) holds when x i = W . The proof is in two steps.
Step
contradicting symmetry.
Next Lemma follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 6. Let f be a strategy-proof and symmetric rule. LetN N , i ∈ N \N , and K
for each j ∈N,
Proof.
Now, (10) follows from (9).
Consider a rule f satisfying the axioms of the Theorem on the domain R n . Given ∈ M and x − ∈ Z − , when a preference profile belongs toR N (x − ), by samesideness (Lemma 1), each agent receives his own peak amounts of all commodities except for commodity (or, including commodity in the case where the sum of the peak amounts of commodity is also equal to the supply of commodity ). Accordingly, onR N (x − ), f induces a rule for commodity . Lemma 7 says that this induced rule is the single-commodity uniform rule. Although we borrow some techniques from Sprumont (1991) and Ching (1994) , as we discuss below, we cannot directly apply their proofs to obtain Lemma 7. 
Then, since the single-commodity uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Paretoefficiency, and symmetry (Sprumont, 1991; Ching, 1994) ,f is the single-commodity uniform rule.
Therefore, if symmetry implied symmetry for commodity , then we could directly apply their result to obtain Lemma 7. However, symmetry does not imply symmetry for commodity . We illustrate this point in the next Example.
Example 3. Let N ≡ {1, 2} and M ≡ {1, 2}. Let f be the rule on R
2 defined as follows:
. Letf be the restriction of f toR
. In fact,f 1 is dictatorial, and so it violates symmetry for commodity 1.
Furthermore, as we discussed in Section 2, in the one-commodity case, any Pareto-efficient and symmetric rule is strongly symmetric. Ching (1994) could apply strong symmetry to prove this uniqueness result. However, in the multiplecommodity case, since same-sideness and symmetry do not imply strong symmetry, we cannot apply strong symmetry to obtain Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, symmetric, and nonbossy rule. Then, for each
We introduce some notations. Given a preference profile
. We simply write π 1 , . . . , π n when we can omit R as an argument without confusion. Let R N (0) be the set of preference profiles R such that i∈N p (R i ) < W and for each
. Given k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, let R N (k) be the set of preference profiles R such that i∈N p (R i ) < W and
, and
Note that
, and each i ∈ N , we have
, then, by group uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-ii), f (R) = f (R). Thus, we only have to show that for
. Without loss of generality, let j = 1. Denote
, and (iii) for each k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n},
Then, by peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), f (R) = f (R).
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on k. Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. When k = 1, by
Step 1-1, we have already proven that (b) holds. Assume that k ≥ 2. Case (a) (Figure 8 ): k is even. Our induction hypothesis is that there isN ⊂ N such that |N | = k − 1, and for
(by k ≥ 2 and (11))
Case (b) (Figure 9 ): k is odd. Our induction hypothesis is that there isN ⊂ N such that |N | = k − 1, and for
Suppose on the contrary that for each
(by k ≥ 2 and (11)) Thus, Step 1-2 holds.
Step 1-3. We derive a contradiction to conclude that for each
There are two cases. Case 1: n is even.
Then, by Case (a) of Step 1-2, for each
which is a contradiction. Case 2: n is odd.
which is a contradiction.
Step 2. Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 2}. Assume that for each h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, eacĥ
Proof. Let R ∈ R N (k + 1, 0). Without loss of generality, assume that agents are indexed so that
Step 2-1.
, which is a contradiction.
Step 2-2.
. Repeating the same argument for i = 2, . . . , n, we have f (R) = f (R).
By feasibility,
Step 2-1 and
Step 3.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on k. Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 2}. Assume that
By
Step 1, we have already proven that (A) holds when k = 1. We will prove that
Without loss of generality, we may assume that agents are indexed so that
Then, by the definition of U , for each i ∈ K, U i (R) = p (R i ), and for each
Step 2, we have already proven that for each
Without loss of generality, assume that j = k + 1. Note that, since for each
. Then, (i) for each h ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n − k}, e h > 0 and e h < e h−1 , (ii) for each h ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n − k},
, and (iii) for each h ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n − k},
Step 3-1.
Proof. The proof is similar to Step 1-1. By contradiction, suppose not. Since
and (b) if h is odd, then there isN
Proof. The proof is similar to Step 1-2, and proceeds by induction on h. Let h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − k}. When h = 1, by
Step 3-1, we have already proven that (b) holds. Assume that h ≥ 2.
Case (a): h is even. Our induction hypothesis is that there isN ⊂ N \ K such that |N | = h − 1 and
. By (A) and Step 2, for each
(by h ≥ 2 and (12))
(by h ≥ 2 and (12)) Thus, Step 3-2 holds.
Step 3-3. We derive a contradiction to conclude that for each
By (A) and Step 2, for each
Then, by Case (a) of Step 3-1,
Step 4. For each
. By Steps 1 and 3, when k = n − 2, we have already proven that the assumption of Step 2 holds. Thus Step 2 implies that for each i ∈ N \ {n},
. By own uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-i), f (R) = f (R n , R −n ). Thus, for each i ∈ N , we have f i (R) = U i (R).
In the same way, we can also show that for each x − ∈ Z − , each R ∈R N (x − ) such that i∈N p (R i ) > W , and each i ∈ N , we have f i (R) = U i (R). We have completed the proof of Lemma 7.
unanimity, and symmetry. The proportional rule 19 satisfies unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness, but not strategy-proofness. The queuing rules 20 satisfy strategyproofness, unanimity, and nonbossiness, but not symmetry. The equal distribution rule 21 satisfies strategy-proofness, symmetry, and nonbossiness, but not unanimity. Thus, it is an open question whether the uniqueness part of our theorem holds without nonbossiness.
In the one-commodity case, since the uniform rule is nonbossy, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and symmetry imply nonbossiness (Sprumont, 1991; Ching, 1994) . Moreover, effectively pairwise strategy-proofness and unanimity imply nonbossiness (Serizawa, 2006) .
22 Therefore, it is an interesting question whether their characterizations of the uniform rule for the one-commodity case extend to the multiplecommodity case.
• Figure 1 . Illustration of (R 1 ,R 2 ) in the proof of Lemma 1. ) and p(R 2 ) = (
). Note thatR(R 1 ) =R(R 2 ). Figure 10 . Illustration ofR in the proof of Step 2 (Lemma 7) and Theorem.
